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Disrespecting the  
“Opinions of Mankind”
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Eugene Kontorovich
IN ROPER V. SIMMONS, the Supreme Court, after rehearsing the international and foreign condemnation of the death 
penalty for 6 and 7 year olds, held that 
such punishment also violates the Eighth 
Amendment.¹ In recent years, international 
law has made brief appearances in Atkins 
and Lawrence, but only as part of the cho-
rus. In Roper, it got star billing – an en-
tire roman numeral of the Court’s opinion 
(roughly 20% of the total pages) is devoted 
to considering international instruments 
and practices. Thus Roper represents a sig-
nificant victory for the view that American 
courts should look abroad when interpret-
ing the U.S. Constitution (a position which 
will be referred to here to as “international-
ist”). The significance of this victory is un-
certain because Roper does not suggest that 
international law is binding on U.S. courts 
in constitutional cases. Rather, the Court 
says “the opinion of the world community” 
can provide “confirmation for our own con-
clusions.”² This is an extraordinarily hon-
est admission that the Court will only cite 
international opinion when it supports the 
result the justices wish to reach for other 
reasons; if “the opinion of the world com-
munity” contradicts that of the majority, it 
won’t find its way into the Opinion of the 
Court.³
Still, Roper’s extended discussion of 
“the opinion of the world community” in a 
constitutional case deserves closer atten-
tion. This Article will consider a particu-
lar argument that has often been advanced 
for the internationalist approach, one that 
is reflected in the Roper opinion itself. The 
Eugene Kontorovich is an assistant professor at the George Mason University School of Law.
  544 U.S. __, 25 S. Ct. 83 (2005).
 2 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
 3 Justice Scalia notes that the Court ignores other countries’ laws when it comes to the establishment 
of religion or abortion rights. See id. at 227 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But he has not caught the Court 
in a contradiction, because Justice Kennedy’s opinion admits that it uses international materials op-
portunistically.
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phrase “opinion of the world community” is 
a politically-correct update of the “opinions 
of mankind” to which the Declaration of 
Independence said “decent respect” should 
be paid.⁴ The similarity in language is not 
fortuitous. Justice Ginsburg, speaking just 
one month after Roper, said the decision 
represents, “perhaps the fullest expression[] 
to date on the propriety and utility of look-
ing to ‘the opinions of [human]kind.’”⁵ In 
recent years, the Declaration’s preamble has 
been frequently cited by champions of the 
internationalist approach as evidence that 
American law should look to and incorpo-
rate foreign values. Because Thomas Jeffer-
son, the author of the Declaration, insisted 
on paying a “decent respect to the opinions 
of mankind,” the internationalists argue 
that the use of foreign law is as American 
as apple pie, especially on such “opinionated” 
issues as the morality of capital punishment. 
In this view, Roper is not a departure, but 
rather a traditionalist return to the princi-
ples of the founding.
Indeed, the Declaration’s solicitude for 
the “opinions of mankind” has become a 
staple of the internationalist argument. The 
phrase has been invoked by the nation’s 
most respected and influential international 
law scholars.⁶ The importance the interna-
tionalist view places on the preambulatory 
passage can be inferred from the very titles 
of some articles.⁷ Moreover, the impact of 
the argument extends far beyond the acad-
emy. It has been embraced by several of the 
justices who favor using international mate-
 4 While the Declaration’s language may lack gender-inclusiveness, the Court’s phrase lacks a certain ex-
clusiveness. If the world can constitute a community, it is hard to imagine what is not a community. The 
galaxy perhaps? 
 5 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Compara-
tive Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Soci-
ety of International Law (April , 2005), available at www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg05040.
html. 
 6 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 43–44 
(2004) (“[I]n an interdependent world, United States courts should not decide cases without paying 
“a decent respect to the opinions of mankind,” in the memorable words of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. The framers and early Justices understood that the global legitimacy of a fledgling nation cru-
cially depended upon the compatibility of its domestic law with the rules of the international system 
within which it sought acceptance.”); Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk With You, LEG. AF-
FAIRS 43 ( July/Aug. 2004) (“Far from being generally hostile to foreign countries’ views or laws, the 
founding generation had what the signers of the Declaration of Independence described as a ‘decent 
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind’”.); David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitu-
tion, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 67 (2002) (referring to “the Jeffersonian ideal of paying decent respect 
to the opinions of mankind” as a legitimate reason for the U.S. to sign multilateral human rights 
treaties).
 7 See, e.g. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect To International Tribunal Rulings, 96 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’ L. PROC. 42, 46–48, nn. 9, 4 (2002) (“From the very beginning of the U.S. Republic, dating 
back to the Declaration of Independence, American courts have treated international law as part of 
our law and paid decent respect to the opinions of mankind. To reject that history and adopt a 
rule of “no deference” to international precedents would be fundamentally antihistorical.”); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
085, 087–89 (2002) (“Obeying the law of nations was considered part and parcel of paying decent 
respect to the opinions of mankind.”); Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 
25 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 25, 227–28 (992) (emphasis added) (“[T]he authors of the Declara-
tion of Independence thought that it was important and necessary to accord decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind. … The conveners of this conference have apparently concluded that we accord 
decent respect to the opinions of mankind about our Bill of Rights, and attend to mankind’s criticisms 
of it.”).
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rials in constitutional adjudication.⁸ 
Over a decade ago, Justice Blackmun in 
a much-cited article criticized the Court for 
failing in its juvenile death penalty rulings “to 
inform its decisions with a ‘decent respect to 
the opinions of mankind.’”⁹ In Roper itself, 
when at oral argument the Missouri state so-
licitor pointed out that the Founders would 
object to the vast power international-style 
constitutional interpretation would give the 
Court, Justice Ginsburg retorted: “did [ Jeffer-
son in the Declaration] not also say that to … 
lead the world, we would have to show a de-
cent respect for the opinions of mankind?”¹⁰
The function of the “opinions of mankind” 
in the internationalist argument is to show 
that this approach has the most ancient and 
noble domestic pedigree, that the Founding 
generation would be sympathetic to what is 
now considered an innovative and contro-
versial practice.¹¹ The internationalists do 
not wish to admit to possessing what Rob-
ert Frost, in writing of the creation of the 
post-war international institutions, called 
“the courage to be new.”¹² They do not claim, 
or wish to be seen as advocating, a major 
departure from American legal traditions.¹³ 
The attempt to legalize and internationalize 
 8 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Willingness to consider foreign 
judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a ‘decent 
respect to the opinions of mankind.’”); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The 
Value Of A Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. S POL’Y REV. 329, 330 
(2004):
In the value I place on comparative dialogue – on sharing with and learning from others – I 
count myself an originalist in this sense. The 776 Declaration of Independence, you will recall, 
expressed concern about the opinions of other peoples; it placed before the world the reasons why 
the United States of America … was impelled to separate from Great Britain. The Declaration 
did so out of “a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.”
 9 See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 04 YALE L.J. 39, 45, 48 (994) 
(“Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no less than interpretations of treaties and statutes, should 
be informed by a decent respect for the global opinions of mankind.”).
 0 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, available at www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argu-
ment_transcripts/03–633.pdf. Missouri’s counsel meekly accepted Justice Ginsburg’s characterization 
of Jefferson’s views. Id. at 8.
  Looking to the Declaration to divine the acceptable sources of authority for Article III courts is an in-
herently problematic endeavor. The Declaration announced the existence of a nation not yet governed 
by the Constitution, or even the Articles of Confederation. Nor was it seen by the Founding generation 
as a font of constitutional values: it “played almost no part in the debates over the ratification of the 
Constitution.” GARY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
324 (978). Those who cite it in support of the internationalist argument seem to use it as evidence of 
the Founding generation’s general attitude towards world opinion, rather than as shedding light on the 
meaning of any particular Constitutional provision or practice.
 2 The phrase is obviously sarcastic. Frost saw the “new” U.N. as merely the latest incarnation of a series 
of failed attempts at world peace, such as the League of Nations. ROBERT FROST, “The Courage to 
Be New,” in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 387 (969) (originally published in STEEPLE BRUSH 
(947)):
Heartbroken and disabled   They will tell you more as soon as
In body and mind,   You tell them what to do
They renew talk of the fabled  With their everbreaking newness
Federation of Mankind. …   And their courage to be new.
 3 See Roper, 25 S. Ct. at 200 (“It does not lessen our fidelity to our Constitution or our pride in its 
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations … 
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”).
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humanitarian norms is objectively, and often 
unabashedly, a “progressive” development, 
which is to say newfangled. Yet the domestic 
side of this effort turns to a most conservative 
argument – what the Founders thought.¹⁴ One 
could imagine many proponents of interna-
tionalism regarding, for other constitutional 
purposes, the attitudes of the Framers as a 
matter of ancient history, the Declaration, as 
primordial pre-history. Of course there’s not 
 4 In another example of this phenomenon, proponents of expanding universal jurisdiction – that is, the 
assertion of jurisdiction over an international law violation by a nation with no connection to the 
offense – frequently invoke as a precedent the 8th century law of piracy. See Eugene Kontorovich, 
The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 83, 95–99, 
204–07 (2004). The analogy to piracy seems to acknowledge that under our constitutional system, it 
would help to accept what might otherwise appear as a massive expansion of federal judicial power if it 
had sanction in practices known to and approved of by the Framers. Id. at 208–09.
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much wrong with being a born-again origi-
nalist, if even for one night – if the originalist 
argument stands on its own terms. However, 
it will be shown that contrary to the interna-
tionalist position, the Declaration was writ-
ten to shape the opinions of mankind; it did 
not contemplate being influenced by them.¹⁵
I
The invocation of “decent respect” to suggest 
that American courts should defer to or even 
consider foreign views is in effect a misquo-
tation. Its force depends entirely on lifting 
the words from their context – on ignoring 
the second half of the clause from which the 
words are taken.¹⁶ The Declaration in no 
way suggests that “decent respect to the opin-
ions of mankind” requires following those 
opinions. Rather, all that decent respect “re-
quires” of us is that we explain our actions 
to the world – that the colonists “declare the 
causes which impel them to the separation.”¹⁷ 
Thus the very same sentence of the Declara-
tion that appeals to the “opinions of man-
kind” also shows the limits of the appeal: the 
colonists were not following the opinions of 
mankind, but merely informing the world 
that they had a reasoned position for follow-
ing their own opinion. Thus “decent respect” 
is not about importing foreign opinion but 
rather about exporting our views to an inter-
ested foreign audience, in the form of a Dec-
laration. In the Founding era, the Justices 
were under no illusion that “decent respect” 
was about “learning from others,” as Justice 
Ginsburg put it; they understood that it was 
about informing others.¹⁸
To put it differently, if the colonists were 
to respect the opinions of mankind in the 
way that Atkins, Lawrence and Roper do, 
there would never have been a revolution. 
Indeed, the colonists’ termination of loyalty 
to their sovereign monarch was hardly trace-
able to anything in the prevailing “opinions 
of mankind.” It was, if anything, at odds 
with those opinions. At the time, a people’s 
right to govern themselves and to break 
with their king to do so were entirely radical 
views, unsupported by any state practice and 
fundamentally threatening to the existing in-
ternational order.¹⁹ While Locke and other 
 5 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence v. Texas and the Imperative of Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 555, 557 (2004) (emphasis added) (“The first paragraph of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence announced that the colonists’ decision to separate from the United Kingdom was reached in a 
process that accorded “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”). Of course the decision to separate 
had nothing to do with the opinions of mankind, it was entirely a product of American sentiment.
 6 The inaccuracy of the quotation has been previously noted. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Ma-
terials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 72 n.7 (2004).
 7 Emphasis added.
 8 See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 99, 223 (796) (Chase, J.) (observing that a “decent respect for the 
opinions of mankind” made it “proper to give notice of the event to the nations of Europe”).
 9 See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–54, 
208–09 (992).
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social contract theorists had laid the philo-
sophical foundation for revolution, it could 
hardly be said that such notions had won 
the acceptance of the European states. The 
Declaration’s invocation of “the opinions of 
mankind” in no way suggests that Congress 
would change its course if other nations in-
sisted that it was violating international law. 
Quite the opposite: the Declaration closes 
by saying that nothing will stay the new na-
tion from its chosen course. Later, the views 
articulated in the Declaration would find a 
receptive audience in France, and, eventually, 
much of the rest of the world. But this could 
only happen because the Founding genera-
tion believed in the superiority of their no-
tion of government, and would not accede to 
the dominant monarchial conception. 
II
To understand what “the opinions of man-
kind” meant to the Founding generation, 
one must consider why they appealed to 
them. The Declaration was solely intended 
to affect foreign opinion – but not in a way 
that supports the internationalist argument. 
For just as the internationalists take the 
“opinions of mankind” phrase out of its tex-
tual context, they entirely ignore its historical 
context. Looking at that context shows that 
the Founding generation was not concerned 
with international opinion about the legality 
of its conduct, but solely with the opinions of 
a few powerful nations about the rebellious 
colonies’ creditworthiness and perseverance.
The principal purpose of issuing the Dec-
laration was to solicit financial and military 
aid from France,²⁰ and hopefully to draw 
her and Spain into the war against Britain.²¹ 
In the spring of 776, many prominent pa-
triots still hoped that reconciliation with 
the crown would be possible, and measures 
short of total independence might suffice. 
Congress understood that France and Spain 
would not mount operations to assist the 
colonists if they thought the wavering reb-
els would quickly reconcile themselves with 
Britain after taking a licking in the coming 
summer campaign.²² The colonists would 
need to borrow money, but this would hard-
ly be forthcoming if France and Spain didn’t 
expect Congress to be around to repay. Thus 
the ensuing list of grievances is meant not so 
much to convince the Europeans of the jus-
tice of the Americans’ cause, as to convince 
them that Americans deeply believe in the 
justice of their own cause, and harbor a deep 
sense of injury that will prevent reconcilia-
tion.²³ This is the import of the Declaration’s 
stirring final words: we are wholly commit-
ted – in “our lives, our fortunes, and our sa-
cred honor” – to the fight.
To be sure, Congress also hoped the Dec-
laration would yield what might be thought 
of as “international law” benefits, in particular, 
 20 See WILLS at 325 (“About the motive for declaring independence there can be no doubt … it was a 
necessary step for securing foreign aid in the ongoing war effort.”).
 2 In Congress, the Declaration was raised as a “measure[ ] … for procuring the assistance of foreign 
powers,” see THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 3, in WRITINGS (984), and the timing was 
partially motivated by the desire to have France’s help in the difficult summer campaign.
 22 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 763–89 at 82 (3rd ed. 992) (“The Decla-
ration of Independence itself was issued mainly for the purpose of assuring potential allies that the 
Americans were playing for keeps and would not fly into the mother country’s arms at the first sign of 
parental indulgence.”).
 23 See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE. See also JONATHAN R. DULL, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (985) (“The Declaration was largely a foreign policy statement; without 
it America could hardly appeal for foreign assistance against the great army gathering to attack New 
York.”).
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the advantages that accompany state recog-
nition: the opening of foreign trade and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, which 
would facilitate the making of defense and 
commercial treaties.²⁴ As Jefferson wrote, “a 
declaration of Independence would render it 
consistent with European delicacy for Euro-
pean powers to treat with us.”²⁵ International 
lawyers often point to state recognition as an 
area where international law is particularly 
robust: without the international norms of 
recognition, “states” would not exist at all. 
However, the proponents of the Declaration 
saw its importance in practical, geopoliti-
cal, rather than legalistic, terms. As Thomas 
Paine argued in Common Sense, it would 
be “unreasonable to suppose that France or 
Spain would offer us any kind of assistance 
if we mean only to make use of that assis-
tance” to remain in the Empire but on more 
favorable terms. And the Founders, keen as 
they were on opening trade with France, re-
jected the “constructivist” view of statehood. 
While nodding to “European delicacy,” they 
did not believe that America’s existence as a 
nation turned on the legalism of recognition. 
As the supporters of the Declaration put it 
in Congress, “the question was not whether, 
by a declaration of independence we should 
make ourselves what we are not; but whether 
we should declare a fact that already exists.”²⁶
In today’s international law, “the commu-
nity of nations” means more or less that. The 
practice of South Africa or Russia is as rel-
evant as that of El Salvador or Tuvalu. The 
appeal is truly to the general view of govern-
ments around the world. Yet the “Mankind” 
to which the Declaration speaks is hardly 
this ecumenical. It is narrower than the set 
of civilized nations; narrower even than Eu-
rope. The Declaration’s “Mankind” is: France, 
Spain, and perhaps Holland – likely and po-
tential players in the nation’s struggle to be 
born.²⁷ The opinions of, say, Russia, would 
hardly matter; not because the authors had 
a crabbed view of the international commu-
nity or the legitimate participants in interna-
tional law-making, but because the men to 
whose opinions the authors appealed were 
those who could act, through arms or money, 
to the fledgling nation’s benefit or prejudice. 
Nonetheless, one can learn from the Dec-
laration about the Founders’ views on the 
relevance of international opinion. Interna-
tional legal approval itself counts for nothing; 
all that counts is the opinions of a few states 
with the power and political inclination 
to help. To the extent the opinion of those 
states counts, it is only if their favorable im-
pression would lead them to confer specific 
military and trade advantages on America. 
Foreign approval in the moral or sentimental 
sense counts for nothing, nor do their views 
of our purely internal arrangements: no one 
expected Spain to be enamored of the con-
cepts of rebellion, popular sovereignty, and 
republicanism.
To apply this worldview to current de-
bates, European opinions on the juvenile 
death penalty should only be considered if, 
say, France or Spain would send a division to 
Iraq if we satisfied their “European delicacy.” 
Of course, France would never send such a 
division (if it had one to spare), and Spain 
has already withdrawn its troops, and is un-
likely to send them back in consideration for 
 24 See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30–3 (957).
 25 See JEFFERSON at 6.
 26 Id. at 5. See also Ware, 3 U.S. at 223.
 27 In Jefferson’s notes of the debates on the Declaration, France and Spain, the only nations poised to fight 
Britain, are the only countries mentioned. In the surrounding discussions, Holland is also mentioned 
as an attractive trading partner once independence is established.
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Roper. In this light, Justice Ginsburg’s use of 
the Declaration to support a reliance on “for-
eign judicial views” is particularly inappro-
priate; foreign judges may be able to invite 
American ones to deliver lectures, but they 
cannot bestow the more significant benefits 
of arms in wartime. 
III
Most of those who invoke the Declaration 
in support of the internationalist approach 
would not go so far as to say that fidelity to 
the Founders’ views requires adherence to for-
eign law. Why then quibble about their use 
of the phrase? Firstly, atextual and ahistoric 
quotation makes for bad legal arguments, 
and thus bad law. If there is an argument to 
be made for relying on foreign law in consti-
tutional interpretation, it must be made on 
its own terms, not with those swiped from 
the Founders. Second, a decent respect for 
our founding documents requires that we 
not lose sight of their meaning through re-
peated mischaracterization, however casual.
One might worry that scholars and judg-
es who play fast-and-loose with our own re-
vered founding documents will not fight fair 
with the massive arsenal of foreign law with 
which they seek to arm themselves. One of 
the biggest problems with using international 
and foreign legal materials is their malleabil-
ity. There is much to choose from, so judges 
may point to those parts of foreign law that 
support their argument, while leaving out 
those that do not²⁸ – a selectivity akin to lift-
ing a quote from its textual context. Actual 
foreign legal practices are often hard to iden-
tify; practice may differ dramatically from 
laws in the books and thus a sensitivity to 
context is crucial. The lack of decent respect 
for the Declaration, which lawyers and judg-
es may be presumed to know well, makes 
one wonder how carefully an internationalist 
judge would parse international conventions, 
to say nothing of the laws of China. 
 28 See Roper, 25 S. Ct. at 223 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll the Court has done today … is to look over 
the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends.”).
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